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Abstract
Security Analysis of Multicast/Unicast Router Key Management Protocols
Yiqi Huang
Key Management Protocols (KMPs) are intended to manage cryptographic keys in a cryptosys-
tem. KMPs have been standardized for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), and these KMPs have
been formally validated for their security properties. In the Internet, routing protocols have different
requirements on their KMPs, which are not met by the existing IPsec KMPs, such as IKE, IKEv2,
and GDOI. Protocol modeling has been used to analyze the security of the IPsec KMPs. For routing
protocols, there are new KMPs proposed by the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols
(KARP) working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force: RKMP, MRKM, and MaRK. These
KMPs are designed to have better applicability for general routing protocols. However, the security
of these protocols has not been validated. In this thesis, we have summarized the necessary conditions
for security of routing protocols. We have analyzed the security aspects of RKMP, MRKM, and
MaRK, by formally validating those protocols using the AVISPA modeling tool. This has shown that
these KMPs meet the necessary security requirements.
Keywords: Security, Routing, Key management.
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Routers are used for managing the flow of data through the Internet. They use a routing protocol
to determine the best route; this involves the exchange of messages with peer routers. The data that
are flowing may contain personal information or business secrets with significant value. Although
the data themselves may be encrypted to protect them, it is also important to ensure that the routers
that are handling these data are legitimate. Therefore we must ensure that the peer exchanges are
secure, and that the peer routers are authenticated.
We can consider the security of the routing exchanges from three aspects: keys and cryptographic
procedures, key maintenance, and control of physical access. Keys and cryptographic procedures
means the use of strong keys and a reliable cryptographic algorithm to generate these keys. With
the rapid development of computer performance, most current cryptographic algorithms will be less
secure in five years and insecure in ten years, which makes it very important to keep cryptographic
algorithms up-to-date. Key maintenance includes procedures to ensure that keys remain effective,
such as key hygiene, key replacement and key rollover. It is never safe to configure some keys
and leave them in place for five years. Control of physical access ensures that the cryptographic
parameters cannot be obtained by non-electronic means. For example, simply walking into an office
and seeing the keys written on the whiteboard, or accessing the console of a router. Making sure
all the keys and networking equipment are under good control of physical access is the baseline of
routing security.
Each routing protocol will have one or more mechanisms to ensure the security of its message
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exchanges. Different routing protocols will, in general, have different approaches. It is also
possible that a specific routing protocol will have more than one possible mechanism that has
been standardized. Thus, a general view of routing protocol security needs to take this diversity into
account. Given a particular routing protocol, and a choice of a specific mechanism to be used between
a pair or routers, two things are necessary: procedures to determine the cryptographic parameters to
be used in a specific pairing, and procedures to decide when and how to update these parameters.
In today’s world, installation of the cryptographic parameters is typically done manually. Two
approaches can be used for the allocation of parameters. One is to install the actual keys that will be
used for the secure exchange, and the other is to install a credential, which will be used to authenticate
the peer, and then generate the parameters automatically, using a Key Management Protocol (KMP).
Several KMPs exist for specific types of relationships among the participants. To date, none
has been standardized for the specific area of secure routing. However, recent work in the Keying
and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) has resulted in proposals for KMPs for this area (KARP Project, 2017). Validations of
the security of many standardized KMPs have been done, but to our knowledge no validation of the
security of the KARP proposals has been attempted.
A proposal for managing the updating of keys has been made by Prajapati (Prajapati & Atwood,
2016a). Suggestions for dealing with the diversity of mechanisms for ensuring security are included
in the KARP proposals for KMPs.
In order to have a better understanding of the proposed KMPs, we have modeled their operation
using a security-oriented protocol validation tool, and then designed several experiments to analyze
their security, to see if these protocols meet the general requirements for routing security.
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 outlines previous work in routing protocols and
their security, and presents a previously-developed ideal framework for routing protocol management.
This is followed by a brief introduction of key management protocols (KMP) and some KMPs that
are in use today. Finally, the experimental environment is discussed, and the tools we used to model
the protocols in order to validate their security. Chapter 3 presents the specific problem that we are
going to solve. Chapter 4 gives the details of several scenarios we designed to better analyze the
problem. Chapter 5 demonstrates the validation of our proposed model and gives a summary analysis.
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From this chapter, we will get a better understanding of the background pertaining to the security
problems we are going to analyse, the relevant work that has been done, and where improvement is
needed. Also we will introduce the concepts and terms we are going to use in the following sections.
2.1 Routing Protocol Security
The wide use of the Internet nowadays has created a great challenge to information security.
Routing protocols are used to exchange the topological information among routers within a single
network or between different networks. According to the topological information, routers are able to
select the best paths to forward packets, i.e., these associated with the least cost. Without the correct
routing information, the forwarding of packets could be inefficient, or cause unreachable destinations.
This makes the security of routing protocols into a crucial problem that we have to deal with.
For routing security, a routing protocol needs to make sure of the authenticity of each of the peer
routers and also the integrity of the packets that they exchange. In order to achieve that, most routing
protocols use keys (or a shared secret) to authenticate the peers and use different kinds of security
mechanisms to protect the packets from being modified.
There are many different security mechanisms used by routing protocols. Some examples are:
(1) An authentication trailer, appended to the routing protocol messages, i.e., as part of the routing
protocol payload;
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(2) Using a security service that is part of the transport subsystem, i.e., the TCP-MD5 (Heffernan,
1998) or TCP-AO (Touch, Bonica, & Mankin, 2010) extensions to TCP;
(3) Using the services of IPsec (Internet Protocol Security, 2017), which is a generic security
service at the network (IP) level.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (Rekhter, Li, & Hares, 2005) relies on the transport
subsystem to provide security services. Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (Atwood,
Islam, & Siami, 2010) specifies IPsec to provide its security. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) (Gupta
& Melam, 2006) specifies either an Authentication Trailer, or IPsec.
2.2 Routing Protocol Framework
Just as we discussed, routing security is not just one particular area. In order to achieve a higher
level of routing security, different kinds of components should work together as a system. If we can
get a bigger picture of this system, it would be clearer to know how to make it more secure.
A Four-layer security management framework for routing protocols was introduced by Prajapati
and Atwood (Prajapati & Atwood, 2016b). Table 2.1 shows the basic structure of these four layers.
Layer 1 is the routing protocol layer, all routing protocols that are used in practice, exist in this
layer. Routers running routing protocols work to disseminate network information and maintain the
routing table. Layer 2 has different kinds of security mechanisms, which depend on what routing
protocol the network is running. All the associated keys/SA configurations, and all different kinds of
security parameters are managed on Layer 3. Although there are some KMPs to help manage the
configuration automatically, currently, most configurations are managed manually. We will talk about
all the KMPs later. Layer 4 represents the security configuration of all the routing and management
information, which automatically distributes them to every individual router.
2.3 Key Management
As noted in Section 2.1, IPsec is used in a number of cases to provide the security mechanisms.










Table 2.1: Four-layer Routing Protocol Framework
Key/SA management not only manages the keys, it also includes various security parameters, such as
the cryptographic algorithms, the lifetime of the keys and which shared materials are used to derive
the key. Those parameters should not be generated manually, otherwise the network operator will
have to go to each device and configure the parameters on each of them. This is very expensive,
inefficient, and difficult to maintain. In order to make key management more flexible and scalable,
it is a good solution to use the Four-layer secure management framework with an appropriate Key
Management Protocol (KMP).
There is large amount of routing protocols that are used in different areas. However, the KMPs
are relatively fewer. We will consider two classes of KMPs: those intended to work with IPsec, and
those intended to satisfy the needs of routing protocols.
2.3.1 IPsec KMPs
• IKE
IKE (either IKE or IKEv2) is the protocol used to set up an SA in the IPsec protocol suite. It is
widely used to set up a shared session secret and manage the cryptographic keys for unicast
communications. There are two phases for IKE to set up the security association:
◦ In phase 1, two peers will exchange the key materials, then negotiate the encryption type
so that they can establish a secure and authenticated channel. The shared secret key is
generated using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, and the authentication can
either use a digital signature or a Message Authentication Code (MAC). More specif-
ically, in phase one, the messages consist of request/response pairs. The first pair of
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messages (IKE SA INIT) exchange nonces, negotiate the cryptographic algorithms, and
do a Diffie-Hellman exchange. The second pair of messages (IKE AUTH) authenticate
the previous messages using either digital signature or MAC, exchange identities and
certificates, and establish the first CHILD SA. Parts of these messages are encrypted
and integrity is protected with keys established through the IKE SA INIT exchange, so
the identities are hidden from eavesdroppers and all the fields in all the messages are
authenticated (Kaufman, 2005).
◦ In phase 2, after the secure channel has been established, the IKE peers are able to
negotiate the security association for further use. During phase 2, there will be only
one pair of request/response messages, and it could be initiated by either end of the
IKE SA after the phase 1 exchange has completed. The initiator will start by sending a
CREATE CHILD SA request along with SA offer(s) in the SA payload, and a nonce in
the Ni payload (optionally with KE payload for an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange to
enable stronger guarantees of forward secrecy for the CHILD SA). The responder replies
with the accepted offer in a SA payload (and the Diffie-Hellman value if the initiator sent
the KE payload) and the selected cryptographic suite (Kaufman, 2005). All the messages
exchanged in phase 2 are protected by the key established from phase 1, therefore, the
authenticity and some integrity are achieved.
Compared to the first version, IKEv2 has a number of improvements. For more information,
the need and intent of an overhaul was described in RFC 4306 (Kaufman, 2005).
• GDOI
While IKE is running between two peers to establish a “pair-wise security association”,
the GDOI protocol is runing between a group member and a “group controller/key server”
(controller) and establishes a security association among two or more group members. As with
IKE, GDOI also has two phases of message exchanges. In the first phase, the GDOI members
will be authenticated to the controller, and during the second phase, the valid members can
send a “pull” request to the controller for the group state. A key-encrypting key (KEK) is the
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most important element in group state, which can be used to encrypt keys that decrypt the
application data. The controller can establish the KEK using multicast and will send (“push”)
unsolicited updates of the group security association to members. In fact, the phase 1 of GDOI




GDOI chooses to use ISAKMP (part of IKE) to provide those properties because ISAKMP
phase 1 meets those requirements perfectly. There is a GDOI document that describes how
the ISAKMP Phase 1 protocols meet the requirements of a GDOI Phase 1 protocol (Baugher,
Weis, Hardjono, & Harney, 2003), so we are not going to discuss it deeply.
The phase 2 exchange of GDOI can be divided into two parts of exchanges: GROUPKEY-
PULL and GROUPKEY-PUSH.
GROUPKEY-PULL exchange is protected by the key established by phase 1, and allows
group members to request security associations and keys. At the end of a GROUPKEY-PULL
exchange, the member or members have been authorized and have a set of SAs installed that
represent group policy, and they are ready to participate in the group communications.
GROUPKEY-PUSH rekeys the protocol exchange. The rekey protocol is a datagram initiated
(“pushed”) by the GCKS, usually delivered to group members using an IP multicast address.
The rekey protocol is an ISAKMP protocol, where cryptographic policy and keying material
(“Rekey SA”) are included in the group policy distributed by the GCKS in the GROUPKEY-
PULL exchange. At the culmination of a GROUPKEY-PUSH exchange, the key server has
sent (group) policy to all authorized group members, allowing receiving group members to
participate in secure group communications. If a group management method is included in
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group policy, at the conclusion of the GROUPKEY-PUSH exchange, some members of the
group may have been de-authorized and no longer able to participate in the secure group
communications.
IKEv1 has been made obsolete by IKEv2 because IKEv2 can achieve the same secure level as
IKEv1 but with a better design. Due to the fact GDOI uses the IKEv1 Phase 1 to authenticate
a group member to the group controller, although it is still secure to use GDOI, in order to
get the better performance, there is a way to replace IKEv1 with IKEv2 in GDOI to make it
stronger and it is basically how G-IKEv2 comes up. Strictly speaking, G-IKEv2 is still a work
in progress, but the technology it used is very straightforward, therefore we are not going to
further discuss it, check the document (Rowles, Yeung, Tran, & Nir, 2013) for more details if
necessary.
2.3.2 Routing Security KMPs
The Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) (KARP Project, 2017) working
group of the IETF is working on ways to improve security for key management of routing protocols.
The existing KMPs such as IKE and GDOI are used by IPsec, which means they are not suitable for
the routing protocols that use other mechanisms (e.g., Authentication Trailer or TCP-AO). In order to
make key management more general, they have developed several proposals for KMPs that manage
SA for routing protocol exchange. These are still “work in progress”.
• RKMP
It is based on modifying IKEv2, which we mentioned above. It defines a mechanism for
securing the routing protocols that uses the unicast pairwise communication model. It allows
network devices to automatically exchange keying material-related information between the
network devices (Jethanandani et al., 2013). Unlike IKE, RKMP carries different payloads in
order to adapt itself to different routing protocols.
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Because IKEv2 is an existing mature protocol, there is no need to design new protocol ex-
changes and methods. RKMP makes use of IKEv2 protocol exchanges, policy definitions, and
the state machine to define a key management protocol that can support TCP-AO, BFD, and
RSVP-TE.
The overview of RKMP states is shown as Figure 2.1. It uses the state machine of IKEv2.
When a network device wants to communicate with other peers, they are in State 1 at first.
Before sending any routing protocol packets, two peers need to perform an IKE SA INIT
exchange, which basically carries the secure policy and keying material for generating security
associations. If IKE SA INIT succeeds, both network devices are transferred to State 2. At
this point, the two peers have not authenticated each other yet, so they perform an IKE AUTH
exchange to do the authentication and use the keying material to generate the security associa-
tion for the routing protocol they intend to support.
Figure 2.1: RKMP State Machine (Jethanandani et al., 2013)
Since RKMP supports TCP-AO, BFD, and RSVP-TE, it should generate specific payloads for
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those three protocols.
Payload for TCP-AO: The TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) (Touch et al., 2010) is mainly
designed for BGP and other TCP-based routing protocols. To negotiate TCP-AO policy for
IKEv2, a new Security Protocol Identifier should be defined in the IANA registry for “IKEv2
Security Protocol Identifiers” Magic Numbers for ISAKMP Protocol [IKEV2-PROTOCOL-
IDS](Maughan & Schneider, 1998). RKMP proposes adding a new Protocol Identifier to the
table. The Protocol Name is “TCP AO” and the value is 6.
Payload for BFD: To negotiate BFD authentication policy for IKEv2, a new Security Protocol
Identifier should be defined in the IANA registry for “IKEv2 Security Protocol Identifiers”
Magic Numbers for ISAKMP Protocol [IKEV2-PROTOCOL-IDS](Maughan & Schneider,
1998). RKMP proposes adding a new Protocol Identifier to the table. The Protocol Name is
“BFD” and the value is 7.
Payload for RSVP-TE: To negotiate RSVP-TE authentication policy for IKEv2, a new Security
Protocol Identifier should be defined in the IANA registry for “IKEv2 Security Protocol
Identifiers” Magic Numbers for ISAKMP Protocol [IKEV2-PROTOCOL-IDS](Maughan &
Schneider, 1998). RKMP proposes adding a new Protocol Identifier to the table. The Protocol
Name is “RSVP-TE” and the value is 8.
• G-IKEv2-MRKM
The G-IKEv2 key management protocol protects group traffic, usually in the form of IP
multicast communications among the members of a set of network devices. MRKM is an ex-
tension to G-IKEv2 allowing it to protect routing protocols between a group of network devices.
The exchange of private keying material between two network devices using a dedicated
key management protocol is a common requirement. There is no need to define an entirely
new protocol for routing protocols having this requirement when existing mature protocol
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exchanges and methods have been vetted. MRKM extends the G-IKEv2 protocol exchanges,
policy definitions, and state machine.
The G-IKEv2 GKM protocol provides for a group member (GM) receiving security asso-
ciations from a GCKS in two IKEv2 exchanges: the IKE SA INIT exchange [RFC5996]
(Kivinen, 2012) to set up the encrypted session, and the GSA AUTH exchange (Rowles et al.,
2013) (similar in construction to the IKEv2 IKE AUTH protocol) to authenticate, authorize,
and distribute group policy.
Figure 2.2: G-IKEv2 GSA AUTH Exchange
In the GSA AUTH exchange, the group member (GM) sends the identification of the group
to which it wants to join or register. The key server (KS) authenticates and authorizes the
group member and pushes the policy, traffic selector in GSA payload, and the key in the KD
payload to the group member. At the successful conclusion of the GSA AUTH exchange, the
group member has the policy and the keying material to securely communicate with other
group members that also registered with the key server. With this IKEv2 SA established
between GM and KS, the GM can request for policy and keys of an additional group using the
GSA CLIENT SERVER exchange. In the GSA CLIENT SERVER exchange, the GM will
send the group ID that it wants to join, where the key server response will include the policy
(GSA) and the key material (KD).
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Figure 2.3: G-IKEv2 GSA CLIENT SERVER Exchange
Once a GSA AUTH has completed, the group member and key server may destroy the G-
IKEv2 SA. However, when the number of group members is small, as is usually the case for
routing protocol participants, it is recommended for them to maintain the G-IKEv2 association
SA for the key server to notify group members that they should re-register in order to obtain a
new group policy. This notify exchange replaces a separate rekey mechanism optimized for
large groups.
One of the GSA types is the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) policy. The TEK describes the
Traffic Encryption Policy defined by a supported security protocol. Some routing protocol
definitions (i.e., OSPFv3 (Gupta & Melam, 2006), LMP (Lang et al., 2005), and PIM (Atwood
et al., 2010)) describe the use of ESP and AH, which are supported by existing G-IKEv2 TEK
policy definitions. However, a number of routing protocol specific security transforms exist
and these require new TEK definitions.
Section 4.5 of [I-D.yeung-g-ikev2] (Hartman et al., 2012) defines the TEK payload as a
Protocol-ID followed by a TEK Protocol-Specific Payload, replicated in Figure 2.4 for refer-
ence.
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Figure 2.4: GSA TEK Payload
MRKM extends the list of Protocol-ID values to include a set of routing protocols that use
group keys, shown in Table 2.2.
Protocol-ID Value
RESERVED 0
GSA PROTP IPsec ESP 1
GSA PROTP IPsec AH 2
GSA PROTP OSPFv2 TBD1
GSA PROTP OSPFv3 TBD2
GSA PROTP IS IS TBD3
GSA PROTP LDP HELLO TBD4
GSA PROTP RSVP TE TBD5
GSA PROTP BFD TBD6
Table 2.2: Routing Protocol-ID Values
• MaRK
MaRK protocol is very similar to G-IKEv2, as we discussed before, GDOI establishes a
security association among group members and a “group controller/key server” (short for
GC/KS), and the GC/KS is assigned manually. In this case, if the current GC/KS crashes and
the network administrator could not assign another new GC/KC, then the whole network will
have huge problems. To solve the problem, instead of assigning a GC/KS, MaRK defines an
election procedure to allow the network members to have the ability to elect the GC/KS by
themselves; which gives the network more fault tolerance and self-healing ability.
After a successful GCKS election procedure, a single router is selected to act as the GCKS for
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the group. Similar with other popular announcer electing mechanisms (e.g., VRRP, HSRP), in
MaRK, only GCKSes use multicast to periodically send advertisement messages. Such adver-
tisements can be used as heart beat packets to indicate the aliveness of GCKSes. In addition, a
state machine with six states (Initial, Validate, GCKS, GCKS2, Follower, and Member) shown
in Figure 2.5 is specified for GCKS election. When a router is first connected to a multicast
network, its state is set as Initial, then the router sends a multicast advertisement. If a GCKS is
working on the network, it will reply to the router with an advertisement. After receiving the
broadcasting from the GCKS, the router will try to register with the GCKS using the initial
exchange. Typically this registration will succeed and the state of the router is transferred to
Member. After a certain period, if the router still does not receive any advertisement from a
GCKS or other group members, the router then believes there are no other group members on
the network and sets its state as GCKS. If during the period the router does not receive any
advertisement from a GCKS but receives advertisements from other more preferred routers on
the network, the router believes that the group is involved in a GCKS election process. The
router then adds these more preferred routers into its candidate list. When the time of the
initial state expires, the router tries to authenticate the most preferred one in the candidate list
and validates whether it can be a GCKS. If the validation result is positive, the router then
transfers its state to Member and the validated one transfers its state to GCKS.
Apart from the initialization of a multicast group, the fail-over of a GCKS can also trigger
an election process. For instance, if a router does not receive the heart beat advertisement
for a certain period, then it will transfer its state to Initial and try to elect a new one. In a
GCKS electing process, a router has to stay in the Initial state until a new GCKS is allocated.
Particularly, the router first sends its initial advertisement with its priority and waits for a
certain period. During the period, if a router receives an initial advertisement, which consists
of a lower priority, the router then sends the advertisement again with a limited rate. After
this period, if the router does not find any router with a higher priority, it announces itself as
the GCKS. If two routers have the same priority, the one with the lowest IP source address
used for messages on the link will be the GCKS. After a router transfers its state to GCKS,
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it will reply to the initial advertisements from other routers with GCKS advertisements. It
occurs even when the initial advertisements consist of higher priorities than its priority. This
approach guarantees that a GCKS will not be changed frequently after it has been elected.
After receiving the GCKS advertisement of the newly elected GCKS, other routers transfer
their states to Member.
If a node in state member fails to perform an initial exchange with the router it believes to be
GCKS, it resets its state to initial but ignores advertisements from that router. This way an
attacker cannot disrupt communications indefinitely by masquerading as a GCKS.
Figure 2.5: State Transitions of GCKS Election (Hartman et al., 2012)
2.3.3 KMPs Validation
Among all the KMPs we mentioned above, IKE (either version 1 or version 2) is just a protocol
in the IPsec protocol suite, which has a great limit when we use it to do the key management, and
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it has already been modelled and analyzed on AVISPA website (AVISPA Project, 2017). Plenty of
work has been done to test its security. Therefore, we are not going to further analyze it. GDOI
uses IKE and other technologies to achieve group key management. Similar to IKE, related work of
GDOI has been done including the modelling and analysis (Islam & Atwood, 2010), so we will keep
it out of our scope as well.
On the other hand, comparing to IKE and GDOI, the KMPs proposed by KARP working group
(RKMP, MRKM and MaRK) have some significant differences. As we discussed in the earlier section
(2.3.1 and 2.3.2), RKMP and IKE are both for key management in unicast communication. RKMP
carries more payloads to adapt different network environments while IKE can only be deployed over
IPsec. For GDOI and MaRK, in addition to the payloads, MaRK also adds the election mechanism
which allows the GC/KS to be self-elected by group members within the same group. This election
mechanism MaRK added provides the self-healing ability to the system when certain accidents
happen (e.g., GC/KS crash, group member be compromised) and increase the tolerance of errors.
All the detailed design and explanations of RKMP (Jethanandani et al., 2013), MRKM (Tran &
Weis, 2012) and MaRK (Hartman et al., 2012) could be found in related KARP documents. However,
there is no any work that has been done to analyze their security. This work is achieved in this thesis.
2.4 Protocol Modelling using AVISPA
2.4.1 AVISPA
AVISPA stands for ‘Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications’
(Armando et al., 2005). AVISPA provides a push-button tool as well as an industrial-strength
technology for the analysis of large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications.
AVISPA provides a language called the High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) for
describing security protocols and specifying their intended security properties. HLPSL allows users
to specify different environments and roles played in the protocol as well as their security goals for
the protocol to be validated. According to the abstracted roles and environments, the AVISPA tool
then verifies whether the goals have been met or not.
The AVISPA tool incorporates four back-ends that help it to perform the function of determining
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if a protocol meets the specified goals. The architecture of the tool is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Architecture of the AVISPA Tool
From Figure 2.6, the input to the AVISPA tool is a protocol model written in HLPSL. The HLPSL
specification is translated into a lower level language called Intermediate Format (IF) by a translator
called hlpsl2if. This step is completely transparent to the user. The IF specification is read by any
of the four back-ends of the tool as selected. These back-ends check the protocol and generate an
output either confirming that the protocol is safe or showing that it is vulnerable to attacks thereby
printing out an attack trace. The details of the four back-ends, namely, OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC
and TA4SP can be found in the AVISPA user manual (Team, TA and others, 2006).
Let us now see some details of the protocol specification language provided by AVISPA, that is,
HLPSL.
2.4.2 HLPSL
HLPSL stands for ‘High Level Protocol Specification Language’. The HLPSL is an expressive,
modular, role-based, and formal language. It is used to specify control-flow patterns, data-structures,
alternative intruder models and complex security properties, as well as different cryptographic
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primitives and their algebraic properties (Glouche, Genet, & Houssay, 2006). HLPSL also supports
the Intermediate Format (IF), which is a lower-level language than HLPSL. A translator called
hlpsl2if can translate HLPSL into IF and the IF specification of a protocol is then inputed to the
back-ends of the AVISPA Tool to analyse if the security goals are satisfied or violated (AVISPA
Team and others, 2006).
The three main parts of the HLPSL specification are described below:
(1) Definition of roles HLPSL is a role-based language. There are two kinds of roles. Firstly,
basic roles, which are represented by agents or participants performing some actions. Secondly,
composed roles, which specify how a collection of participants interact with each other.
(2) Declaration of goals This is the section where the user specifies the security goals required by
the protocol being validated. Internally, these goals are represented as Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) formulae but externally useful macros are provided for the commonly used security
goals, namely, authentication and secrecy.
(3) Instantiation of Roles This is similar to calling a function in a high level language such as ‘C’,
where the appropriate type and number of arguments have to be passed into the function being
called. A role can be instantiated from a higher level role by passing the correct arguments to it.
Usually a composed role has a ‘composition’ section in which the basic roles are instantiated.
2.4.3 SPAN
SPAN is short for ‘Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA’ . It comes with a Local Graphical
User Interface for AVISPA. It helps in interactively producing Message Sequence Charts (MSC for
short) which can be seen as an “Alice & Bob” trace from an HLPSL specification. SPAN can represent
one or more sessions of the protocol in parallel with each other according to the informations given in
the role environment. Then, MSCs are produced interactively with the user. SPAN also includes the
possibility to check the values at every moment of the variables of each principals: the user chooses
the variables of each roles he wants to monitor.
The three modes of SPAN are:
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• Protocol Simulation for simulating the protocol and building a particular MSC corresponding
to the HLPSL specification.
• Intruder Simulation for simulating the protocol with an active/passive intruder.
• Attack Simulation for automatic building of MSC attacks from the output of either OFMC or
CL-ATSE tools (Glouche et al., 2006).
2.4.4 System Environment
As we are using the AVISPA tool to analyse the protocol, and the AVISPA tool can only be run
under LINUX and Mac operating system, we decided to run AVISPA under Ubuntu Linux, which
is a Debian-based, and very popular Linux distribution. The AVISPA tool can also be run on other
Linux distributions and the method is very similar.
2.5 AVISPA Models for IKEv2 and GDOI
2.5.1 IKEv2 Model
IKEv2 has already been modelled by Sebastian Mdersheim and Paul Hankes Drielsma using
AVISPA, and the code could be found in the AVISPA library (AVISPA Project, 2017).
The message exchange in the model could be explained in A-B notation as follows:
IKE_SA_INIT:
1. A -> B: SAa1, KEa, Na
2. B -> A: SAb1, KEb, Nb
IKE_AUTH:
3. A -> B: {A, AUTHa, SAa2}K
where K = H(Na.Nb.SAa1.gˆKEaˆKEb) and
AUTHa = {SAa1.gˆKEa.Na.Nb}inv(Ka)
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4. B -> A: {B, AUTHb, SAb2}K
where
AUTHb = {SAb1.gˆKEb.Na.Nb}inv(Kb)
The AVISPA goals of the model:
• secrecy of sec a SK, sec b SK
• strong authentication on sk1
• strong authentication on sk2
The authors did not list the security goals of their modelling, however, from the AVISPA goals
we can speculate the model proves the following level of security.
• Confidentiality of shared key
• Peer authentication
2.5.2 GDOI Model
GDOI has also been modelled and published by Islam and Atwood (Islam & Atwood, 2010).
GDOI is composed of two sub-protocols: GROUPKEY PULL and GROUPKEY PUSH. The
message fields that are related to security analysis of these two sub-protocols are shown in A-B
notation below:
GROUPKEY PULL
1. R - S: M.{h(SKEY.Nr.G).Nr} Krs
2. S - R: M.{h(SKEY.Nr.Ns.SA).Ns.SA} Krs
3. R - S: M.{h(SKEY.Nr.{Nr.Ns} inv(Kr)).{Nr.Ns} inv(Kr)} Krs
4. S - R: M.{h(SKEY.Nr.Ns.Q.DEK.{Nr.Ns} inv(Ks)).Q.DEK.{Nr.Ns} inv(Ks)} Krs
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GROUPKEY PUSH
1. S - R: M.{Q.SA.DEK’.M.Q.SA.DEK’ inv(Ks)} DEK
The two communicating peers S and R represent the GCKS and the receivers of a multicast
group, respectively. According to the paper, the security goals that GDOI should achieve are listed
below:
(1) Replay protection
(2) Secrecy of group keys
(3) Message authentication
(4) Peer authentication
(5) Preventing Man-in-the-Middle attack
By developing GDOI models in AVISPA, the authors detected two attacks, thus the security





As noted in Section 1, the routing protocol is just a very small component when it comes to
routing security. Much work has been done to improve the security level of routing protocols but
actually, these works have very limited effects on preventing routers from being compromised.
When a router receives messages from its peer, for security purposes, the routing protocol has
to ensure that the peer is legitimate, and the received messages have not been modified in transit.
Nowadays, routing protocols use keys to achieve the authenticity and authority of peers, and use
different kinds of security mechanisms to ensure the integrity when messages are on the way. Since
key management protocols negotiate the key used in the routing protocol, the key management
protocols become particularly important. If the key management protocol has been compromised,
the whole routing infrastructure is fragile.
Many Key Management Protocols exist for negotiating keys and other Security Association
parameters for IPsec. For instance, Internet Key Exchange (IKE, sometimes IKEv1 or IKEv2,
depending on version) is the protocol used to set up a security association (SA) between two peers in
the IPsec protocol suite (Internet Protocol Security, 2017). Also, Group Domain of Interpretation
(GDOI) is a cryptographic protocol that takes advantage of IKE and establishes a security association
among group members to do the group key management. Since IKEv2 has already been formally
modeled and proved to be secure, and GDOI uses the technology of IKE to establish the security
association, we have enough reasons to believe GDOI has reached the same secure level as well.
However, for the routing protocols that use other mechanisms (e.g., AT, TCP-AO), the IPsec
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KMPs are clearly inappropriate to use. So the problem is that the use of IPsec KMPs have their
limitations which require the routers within a network to run IPsec protocol suite. The Keying and
Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) working group of the IETF was chartered (KARP
Project, 2017) to explore ways to improve security for routing protocols. In order to solve the problem
we just mentioned, they are developing KMPs in such a way that they could carry different kinds
of payload so that whatever mechanisms the routing protocols are using, the KMP could provide
the appropriate solution. Table 3.1 shows the work on developing KMPs for routing protocols that
occurred within KARP which are not only designed for IPsec.
WORK IN PROGRESS KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS
KMP Type Description Reference




cols in IKEv2 (Jethanan-
dani et al., 2013)
G-IKEv2 Group Based on using IKEv2 in
GDOI
Group key management




Group Based on extending G-
IKEv2
The use of G-IKEv2 for
multicast router key man-
agement (Tran & Weis,
2012)




(MaRK) (Hartman et al.,
2012)
Table 3.1: Work in Progress Key Management Protocols
The problem that we are addressing is to formally model and validate these protocols since they
have not been analysed so that we can make a good evaluation on how secure they are or what
problems they have, then how to fix these problems.
3.1 Security Definition and Properties
As we noted in section 2.2, the Four-layer possible security management framework for routing
protocols will work based on two factors:
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(1) Security mechanisms in routing protocols are strong, so that the routers inside an autonomous
system will not be compromised in the first place.
(2) Key management protocol is strong enough. Since key management protocol manages all the
shared keying materials and the parameters of security association that established among the
group members, it will be a disaster if the KMP itself is not secure enough.
For the first factor, KARP and other working groups have put many efforts to make the routing
protocol security mechanisms more reliable. Also, many reports and papers have been published
aiming to analyze the routing protocol security aspect, which gives us enough reasons to believe the
security mechanisms in most routing protocols can be trusted.
As the second factor, we will discuss and analyse those KARP proposed KMPs in the later
sections.
3.1.1 KMP security
In order to better analyse the protocols and support the conclusion, the security definition of
key management protocol should be clarified and the security properties of those KMPs should be
discussed as well.
Due to the different usages of a protocol, there could be many definitions of security. In order to
find out a way to verify the security of the key management protocol, we need to understand what is
the main purpose of a KMP. In the documentation of ISAKMP (part of IKE) (Piper, 1998), it is noted
that the key management protocol should be able to manage the Security Association (including
negotiating, establishing, modifying, and deleting Security Associations along with their attributes)
and handle the establishment of cryptographic key for the Internet.
As the above procedures are very important, the definition of the KMP security is to ensure the
above procedures are achieved securely.
The term “key management” refers to the establishment of the keys which are generated by
cryptographic keying materials and cryptographic algorithms to provide protocol security services,
especially integrity, authentication, and confidentiality (Bellovin & Housley, 2005). As our main
targets, RKMP, MRKM and MaRK are all automated key management protocols, they derive one
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or more short-term session keys by making use of long-term keys (pre-shared symmetric secret
value, RSA public key, DSA public key, and others). Apart from that, they also provide several other
features such as protection against replay attack, authentication of each peer, and confirmation that
short-term keys are generated.
3.1.2 Type of Keys
The following symmetric keys are manipulated by the KMPs we discussed in this paper:
• PSK (Pre-Shared Key) : a PSK is a pair-wise unique key, which can be used for
securing the routing protocol exchanges or be used for authenticating a network
device by a KMP. These keys are configured by some mechanism such as manual
configuration or a management application outside of the scope of KMP.
• Protocol master key: A protocol master key is a key exported by a KMP for use
by a routing protocol. This is the key that is shared in the Key Management Data
Base (KMDB) between the routing protocol and KMP. A routing protocol may use
a protocol master key directly or derive traffic keys from it.
• Traffic/Transport key: A traffic/transport key is the key actually used to protect
the integrity of the routing messages exchanged in a routing protocol. In existing
cryptographic authentication mechanisms for routing protocols, the traffic key
can be the same as or derived from the protocol master key. If there is no KMP
provided, a traffic key can be the same as or derived from a pre-shared key.
• KEK (Key Encryption Key): A KEK is a key used to encrypt group key manage-
ment messages to the current members of a group. A KEK is learned as the product
of establishing a security association or through a group key management message
encrypted in a previous KEK. A KEK has an explicit expiration but may also be
retired by a message encrypted in the KEK sent by the GCKS.(Jethanandani et al.,
2013)
A simple comparison between the keys described in this section is provided in the following table.
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Group Used by group members




RP usage Group Used by group members
to secure routng packets
Table 3.2: Comparison of Keys
3.1.3 Security Properties
(1) RKMP: As we discussed in section 2, RKMP is a modified version of IKEv2, that is to say, the
properties are very similar to IKE, such as automatically exchanging keying material and setting
up a shared session secret from which cryptographic keys are derived. In all, the properties
could be simplified as two things: first, authenticate the other peer during the exchange, and
second, build a secure channel between the two peers for secure communication. Unlike
IKE, which only supports devices that deploying IPsec, RKMP could be used integrated with
TCP-AO, BFD or even RSVP-TE. Although the payload will certainly be different depending
on the different authentication mechanism, the properties will be the same.
(2) MRKM: Since MRKM is very similar to G-IKEv2, we could say MaRK shares most of the
security properties with G-IKEv2. Compared to GDOI, G-IKEv2 fixed the cryptographic
weakness with authentication HASH and improved performance and network latency, as well
as some reliabilities. So it should have the following properties as G-IKEv2 and GDOI:
• Authenticating the group members to a group controller.
• Establishing a security association among group members.
• Using the security association to encrypt the messages during further communications.
(3) MaRK: Since MaRK is very similar to G-IKEv2 but with election procedure in it, we could
say MaRK shares most of the security properties with G-IKEv2. MaRK also defines an
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election procedure for a valid group controller, which should be able to finish the election in a
reasonable time and the potential new group controller should be authorized before it becomes
the official group controller.
3.1.4 Performance Properties
To make those key management protocols fully functioning, only security properties are not
enough, there should be certain performance properties as well, such as the algorithm election,
different kinds of payload to make protocol flexible, etc.
However, the KMP performance is not relevant to its security. It is important especially when it
is been deployed, but it is a little out of our scope.
3.2 Security Goals
To analyse the security of the KMPs we mentioned above, a set of security goals should be
made. Since RKMP, MRKM, and MaRK are proposed by KARP working group, the general routing
protocol threats document (Barbir, Murphy, & Yang, 2006) and KARP threats document (Lebovitz,
Bhatia, & Weis, 2013) could be used as a starting point for establishing our goals.
Since the protocol should resist the attack of adversaries, the following security goals should be
met:
• RKMP
R-1 Peer authentication, to make sure each peer in the network is valid, mutual authentication
must be performed.
R-2 Message authentication, which includes origin authentication and integrity authentication.
R-3 Confidentiality of RP keys. The RP keys are derived to protect the routing protocols, so
they must be kept secret.
R-4 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). If necessary, the
network devices may destroy the state associated with the IKEv2 SA then rekey an IKEv2
SA and establish a new equivalent IKEv2 SA.
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R-5 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system
must be able to ignore it.
R-6 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks.
R-7 Usage of strong keys.
• MRKM
When MRKM is performing exchanges to distribute keys, there may be two kinds of situation:
(1) The router that wants to join the group has no accepted credential. Then GCKS needs
to perform GSA AUTH exchange to ensure that router is valid in order to further
communicate.
(2) The router that wants to join the group is authenticated. The GCKS does not need to
perform the authentication procedure.
MRKM has two sets of security goals, depending on which case is true.
Case 1:
M-1 Group member authentication, to make sure all members in the network are valid, GCKS
and the router must perform mutual authentication before the router joins the group.
M-2 Message authentication, which includes origin authentication and integrity authentication.
M-3 Confidentiality of RP keys. The RP keys are derived to protect the routing protocols, so
they must be kept secret.
M-4 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). If necessary, a
GCKS may need to change the group policy and/or rekey before current keys expire.
M-5 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system
must be able to ignore it.
M-6 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks.
M-7 Usage of strong keys.
Case 2:
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M*-1 Confidentiality of RP keys. The RP keys are derived to protect the routing protocols, so
they must be kept secret.
M*-2 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). If necessary, the
network devices may destroy the state associated with the IKEv2 SA then rekey an IKEv2
SA and establish a new equivalent IKEv2 SA.
M*-3 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system
must be able to ignore it.
M*-4 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks.
M*-5 Usage of strong keys.
• MaRK
Ma-1 Authenticity of the GCKS. If an adversary participates into the election procedure, it
should not pass the authentication.
Ma-2 Authenticity of the initiating routers. The initiating routers need to authenticate to GCKS.
Ma-3 Message authentication of the group key management messages, which includes origin
authentication and integrity authentication.
Ma-4 Confidentiality of RP keys. While routing security does not typically require confiden-
tiality, the key management protocol does because keys are exchanged and these must be
protected.
Ma-5 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). The GCKS MUST
change the protocol master key if a router was part of the group under the current protocol
master key and reboots.
Ma-6 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system
must be able to ignore it.
Ma-7 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Ma-8 Usage of strong keys.
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Peer authentication and origin authentication are two different concepts. Peer authentication
focuses on the authenticity of the peer member, while origin authentication tries to find out if the
message comes from a valid member. Therefore, we divided them into two security goals.
The security goals listed above can be divided into two categories: those that can be formally
proved (i.e., where the analysis performed by AVISPA can be guaranteed) and those that can only be
improved by the practice of certain design techniques, but formal proof is impossible.
The things we can prove with AVISPA are properties that depend only on the sequence of
messages, i.e., time is not relevant. The other properties are those where time has an effect. For
example, the vulnerability of a key depends on the available CPU power, which increases with time.
We can formally model the first category but it is not possible to use formal models for the rest.
For RKMP security goals (R-1,R-2,R-3), MRKM security goals (M-1,M-2,M-3,M*-1) and for
MaRK security goals (Ma-1,Ma-2,Ma-3,Ma-4), which can be proven formally, we will give the
mapping in Section 4 to show more detailed modelling, and in Section 5.2 we make a table 5.2 to
explain the factors to achieve goals.
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Chapter 4
Modelling of RKMP, MRKM and
MaRK using AVISPA
4.1 Protocol Modeling
In order to model and analyse the RKMP and MaRK protocols, we designed several scenarios to
all kinds of different situations that may occur. Each scenario contains a brief description, a list of
roles, and a list of goals.
It is easier to translate a protocol into HLPSL if it is first written in Alice-Bob (A-B) notation;
A-B notation is a high level modeling language that only shows the message exchanges of the
protocol. If the protocol specifies the interaction between only two participants, we usually name
them Alice and Bob, i.e., A-B. The A-B notation is convenient, as it gives us a clear illustration of the
messages exchanged in a normal run of a given protocol. Several protocol specification languages,
including an older version of HLPSL, are based on the A-B notation. In practise, however, A-B
notation is not expressive enough to capture the sequence of events that need to be specified when
considering large-scale Internet protocols. For instance, such protocols often call for control-flow
constructs such as if-then-else branches, looping and other features. A-B notation, which shows
only message exchanges, is too high level to capture such constructs that talk about the execution of
actions by a single participant of a protocol run. Thats why we need a more expressive language,
such as HLPSL.
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HLPSL is a role-based language, meaning that we specify the actions of each kind of participant
in a module, known as a basic role. Later, we could make these resulting participants interact with
one another by “gluing” multiple basic roles together into a composed role.
4.1.1 RKMP
• RKMP model using HLPSL
As mentioned before, we must have the basic roles and composed roles during the modeling
in AVISPA. Since we need to use different scenarios to test the protocol to cover as many
situations as possible, the composed roles, which will be session and environment, in our case
should be slightly different. Therefore, the details of composed roles will be discussed in the
corresponding scenario.
RKMP is used to secure the unicast pairwise communication model. It is much simpler than
multicast as the only thing that we need to secure is the authentication procedure. Once the two
peers have authenticated each other, a secure tunnel is settled. Also, the GCKS can distribute
the policy, routing messages and keys using the tunnel directly.
The authentication procedure can be divided into two parts. The first part is an IKE SA INIT
exchange, which is a two-message exchange that allows the network devices to negotiate
cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonce information, and perform a Diffie-Hellman (DH)
(Boyko, MacKenzie, & Patel, 2000) exchange for their routing protocols. Afterward, protocols
on these network devices can communicate privately. Note that at the end of an IKE SA INIT
exchange the endpoints on the both sides have not authenticated each other yet. For the details
on this exchange, see IKE SA INIT in IKEv2 (Kivinen, 2012).
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Figure 4.1: IKE SA INIT Exchange
Next, the network devices perform an IKE AUTH exchange defined in IKEv2 (Kivinen, 2012).
The SA payloads contain the security policies for a key and the associated parameters, and the
TS payloads contains traffic selectors as defined in IKEv2 (Kivinen, 2012). For the details on
the exchange, see IKE AUTH in IKEv2 (Kivinen, 2012).
Figure 4.2: IKE AUTH Exchange
In the IKE AUTH exchange, the Initiator proposes one or more sets of policies for the key
used to secure a routing protocol in the SAi2. The SA payload indicates that the supported
policies associated with the key are being proposed.
The Responder returns the one policy contained in SAr2 that it accepts. Based on this policy,
appropriate keying material is derived from the existing shared keying material. At the suc-
cessful conclusion of the IKE AUTH exchange, the initiator and responder have agreed upon a
single set of policy and keying material for a particular routing protocol.
If we describe IKE SA INIT and IKE AUTH exchange in A-B notation, it is easier to under-
stand the message flow.
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IKE_SA_INIT:
A -> B: SAa1, KEa, Na
B -> A: SAb1, KEb, Nb
IKE_AUTH:
A -> B: {A, AUTHa, SAa2}K
where K = H(Na.Nb.SAa1.gˆKEaˆKEb) and
AUTHa = {SAa1.gˆKEa.Na.Nb}inv(Ka)
B -> A: {B, AUTHb, SAb2}K
where
AUTHb = {SAb1.gˆKEb.Na.Nb}inv(Kb)
Parameters. In addition to passing the role name, parameters model the keys, the functions,
and some payloads in the above two exchanges. They mainly include:
(1) F. It models hash function to generate AUTH payload.
(2) Ka, Kb. They model the public key used to authenticate and encrypt messages.
Variables. Variables model most of the payloads in the above two exchanges that have fresh
values generated at runtime. In our model, their values are generated using the new() operation
in HLSPL. These variables mainly include:
(1) SA1, SA2. They contain each peer’s preference for establishing SA, in our model, we
abstracted away from the negotiation of cryptographic parameters.
(2) Ni, Nr. They model the nonces.
(3) KEi, KEr. They model the Diffie-Hellman half key used to negotiate the session key.
(4) DHX, DHY. They are the Diffie-Hellman variables.
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Although the exchange is almost the same as IKE, we still design the following scenario
according to the IKEv2 model for learning purposes in order to analyse the authentication
exchange, and all the details we will cover in the next section.
• Scenario 1
◦ Description
This scenario describes the most basic situation about authentication in the unicast case
for the RKMP protocol.
◦ Roles
In this scenario we simulated two roles, Alice and Bob. They are trying to communicate
to each other and before they started the conversation, it is necessary to authenticate each
other and generate a session key for later use. During this procedure, which party starts
is not important, so we assume Alice to be the initiator and Bob the responder.
◦ Goals
Goal description:
(1) Secrecy of session key




%Alice authenticates Bob on sk1
authentication_on sk1





(1) The parties, Alice and Bob, should negotiate mutually acceptable cryptographic
algorithms. This we abstract by modelling that Alice sends only a single offer for a
crypto-suite, and Bob must accept this offer.
(2) There are goals of IKEv2 that we do not yet consider. For instance, identity hiding.
(3) IKEv2-DS includes provisions for the optional exchange of public-key certificates.
This is not included in our model.
(4) We do not model the exchange of traffic selectors, which are specific to the IP

















The intruder is modeled by the channel(s) over which the communication takes places.
In our case, we use Dolev-Yao intruder model (DolevYao model, 2017) to describe the
intruder’s behavior.




ka,kb,ki: public keys of Alice, Bob and intruder
inv(ki): private key of intruder
zero,one: constant in Extension to provide key confirmation
• Goals Mapping
Security goal R-1 (peer authentication) has two components, although each one acts equally in
the communication (either of them can start the authentication). The authentication should be
performed mutually. As such, AVISPA has two goals authentication on sk1 and authentica-
tion on sk2.
Security goal R-2 (message authentication) has two components: authentication of the data
origination point and verification of data integrity. Data origin is verified by encrypting the
secret keys shared by the entities participating in the communication. The secrecy of these
keys is ensured by the security goal R-3.
Security goal R-3 (RP key secrecy) is validated by AVISPA goal secrecy of sec a SK, sec b SK.
38
It is achieved due to the fact that strong authentication is chosen when the two peers perform
the IKE INIT exchange.
4.1.2 MaRK
• MaRK model using HLPSL
The work of MaRK is divided into two tasks:
(1) Modeling the election of new GCKS
(2) Modeling the authentication procedure
We designed two scenarios to test the election section, scenario 2 describes the election be-
tween two routers while scenario 3 starts the election among three routers. If the routers are
more than three, the message exchanges will still be very similar to three routers.
Since the modeling of authentication section is very similar to the modeling of RKMP, we
shared several parameters and variables as we mentioned in RKMP modeling. Thus, we will
only list the differences. They mainly include:
(1) Pr. It models the priority of each router. The routers could elect their new GCKS based
on that priority.
(2) GK. It models the group key and group materials that GCKS will share with the router
after it is authenticated.
We describe two cases that will trigger the election procedure in scenario 2 and scenario 3.
Later in scenario 4 and scenario 5, we explain how the GCKS distributes group keys.
• Scenario 2
◦ Description
This scenario describes the simplest situation that triggers an election procedure. We
assume there are three routers, two members(Alice and Bob) and one GCKS. In this
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scenario, GCKS stops working. That triggers the election procedure between Alice and
Bob.
The election procedure could be divided into three parts:
(1) The two members announce their own priority by sending it to the other members.
(2) The one with lower priority starts the IKE SA INIT exchange as we discussed
before.
(3) After the IKE SA INIT, the IKE AUTH exchange will be performed to finish the
authentication and generate the session key.
◦ Roles
There are three roles: Alice, Bob and GCKS. Since the GCKS stoped working in the first
place, it actually does not take part in the entire exchange. So we only have Alice and
Bob as the two roles to perform the election procedure.
◦ Goals
Goal description:
(1) Secrecy of session key
(2) Authentication on each party
HLPSL Code:
%secrecy of SK between member and GCKS
secrecy_of sec_mem_SK, sec_gcks_SK
%member authenticates GCKS on sk1
authentication_on sk1




(1) The point of this scenario is to trigger an election procedure. Since the election
is based on each member’s priority, which does not have a specific definition, we
simply generate a random number for each member.
(2) After all the routers exchange their priorities, there comes the authentication proce-
dure. Since the authentication method is not indicated in the paper (Hartman et al.,
2012), we use IKEv2-DS in the first scenario to do the job. This means that all the

















The intruder is modeled by the channel(s) over which the communication takes place.
In our case, we use the Dolev-Yao intruder model (DolevYao model, 2017) to describe
intruders behavior.




kr,kx,ki: public keys of two routers and intruder
inv(ki): private key of inturder
pr1,pr2,pi: priorities of two routers and intruder
• Scenario 3
◦ Description
This scenario has three routers that communicate with each other. The steps of message
exchanges are described below.
(1) Three routers exchange their own priority.
(2) The router with highest priority becomes the GCKS, others become members.
(3) Members try to authenticate GCKS using their public keys.
◦ Roles
In order to make the election modelling more general, we have three routers communicat-
ing in this scenario, R, X and Y. By assigning them different priorities, the three parties
will decide their sequences by themselves.
◦ Goals
Goals description:
(1) Secrecy of session key
(2) Authentication on each party
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HLPSL Code:
%shared secrecy among GCKS and other two members
secrecy_of sec_memx_SK, sec_memy_SK, sec_gcks_SK




This scenario is basically an extension of the second one. Compared to the election
between two routers, we extend it to three. In this case, we could push our conclusion to
a more general case (for the situation with more than three routers, it is very similar to
three).
The difference between the previous scenario and this one is that every router has to
compare more priorities than just one. Once the comparison is done, the rest of them
follow the same steps as before, so we can assume the limitation of this scenario is the



















The intruder is modeled by the channel(s) over which the communication takes place.
In our case, we use Dolev-Yao intruder model (DolevYao model, 2017) to describe
intruder’s behavior.




kr,kx,ky,ki: public keys of three routers and intruder
inv(ki): private key of inturder
pr1,pr2,pr3,pi: priorities of three routers and intruder
• Goal Mapping
Security goals Ma-1 and Ma-2 have two components, GCKS and Group Member (GM). When
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the election succeeds, GCKS should start the mutual authentication. Since the roles are differ-
ent, it is better to keep the goals separated. The two authentication goals reflect to AVISPA
goals authentication on sk1 and authentication on sk2 in both scenario 2 and scenario 3.
Security goal Ma-3 (message authentication) has two components, authentication of the data
origination point and verification of data integrity. Data origin is verified by encrypting the
secret keys shared by the entities participating in the communication. The secrecy of these
keys is ensured by the security goal Ma-4.
Security goal Ma-4 (RP key secrecy) is validated by AVISPA goal secrecy of sec mem SK,
sec gcks SK in scenario 2. AVISPA goals secrecy of sec memx SK, sec memy SK, sec gcks SK
are validated in scenario 3. It is achieved by the fact that strong authentication is chosen when
the two peers perform the IKE INIT exchange.
4.1.3 MRKM
• MRKM model using HLPSL
MRKM assumes the GCKS already exists in the network either assigned by the administrator
or elected through MaRK election procedure. The group keys that the GCKS managed will be
distributed to two kinds of routers, authenticated routers and unauthenticated routers.
With unauthenticated routers, MRKM first performs IKE SA INIT exchange, which we dis-
cussed in section 4.1.1 to establish a security tunnel, then followed G-IKEv2 GSA AUTH
exchange, which is substantially the same as the IKE AUTH exchange defined in RFC 5996
(Kaufman, 2005) except that the SA, TSi, TSr payloads in IKE AUTH are not used. Policy and
traffic selectors are pushed from the key server to group members using new payloads GSA and
KD. For the details of the rest of the exchange please refer to Section 4 of (Hartman et al., 2012).
In the GSA AUTH exchange, the group member sends the identification of the group to which
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it wants to join or register. The key server authenticates and authorizes the group member
and pushes the policy, traffic selector in GSA payload, and the key in the KD payload to the
group member. At the successful conclusion of the GSA AUTH exchange, the group member
has policy and keying material to securely communicate with other group members that also
registered with the key server.
With authenticated routers, MRKM would perform GSA CLIENT SERVER exchange. The
GSA CLIENT SERVER exchange is very simple, a group member sends the group ID that
it wants to join, the GCKS then responds with the group policy and keys. All messages they
exchanged will be encrypted with the shared session key that was generated previously.
The A-B notation of both exchanges is listed below:
GSA_AUTH:
A -> B: SAa1, KEa, Na
B -> A: SAb1, KEb, Nb
IKE_AUTH:
A -> B: {A, AUTHa, G}K
where K = H(Na.Nb.SAa1.gˆKEaˆKEb) and
AUTHa = {SAa1.gˆKEa.Na.Nb}inv(Ka)




A -> B: {G}SK
B -> A: {GK}SK
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Scenario 2 and scenario 3 described two cases that will trigger the election procedure, and




This scenario models the exchange that enables the group member to register with the
key server in order to get the policy, traffic selector, and keys used to communicate with
other group members. We divided the exchange into two parts as before.
The first part is IKE SA INIT, which has been used in many protocols as the first step to
allow two parties to negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and perform a
Diffie-Hellman exchange (Boyko et al., 2000).
The second part is G-IKEv2 GSA AUTH exchange, which we already mentioned above.
◦ Roles
In this scenario we have one router (Alice) and GCKS, in which Alice has a creden-
tial but did not authenticate itself to the GCKS yet. GCKS knows the group materials
and will distribute the keys and policies to Alice once Alice has passed the authentication.
◦ Goals
Goals description:
(1) Secrecy of group key
(2) Authentication on each party
HLPSL Code:
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%secrecy of session key and group key
secrecy_of sec_a_SK, sec_g_SK, sec_GK
%Alice authenticates GCKS on sk
authentication_on sk1
%GCKS authenticates on Alice sk2
authentication_on sk2
◦ Limitation
(1) Just the same as limitations in the first scenario.
(2) We do not model the exchange of GSA, which includes group policy for the later use




const sk1, sk2 : protocol_id,
a, g : agent,












The intruder is modeled by the channel(s) over which the communication takes place. In
our case, we use the Dolev-Yao intruder model (DolevYao model, 2017) to describe the
intruder’s behavior.




ka,kg,ki: public keys of Alice, GCKS and intruder
inv(ki): private key of inturder
• Scenario 5
◦ Description
Once an IKEv2 SA has been established between a group member and the GCKS, the
group member could ask GCKS for the group policy and keys of an additional group
using the GSA CLIENT SERVER exchange.
◦ Roles
Since this scenario is relatively simple, we only need Alice, which stands for a group




(1) Secrecy of group key
(2) Authentication on group member
HLPSL Code:
%secrecy of group key
secrecy_of sec_gk
%GCKS authenticates client on skey
authentication_on skey
◦ Limitation
















The intruder is modeled by the channel(s) over which the communication takes place. In
our case, we use the Dolev-Yao intruder model (DolevYao model, 2017) to describe the
intruder’s behavior.
intruder knowledge = {a,g,i}
a,g,i: parties
• Goal Mapping
The security goal M-1 (GM Authentication) has two components, the group member and
GCKS. They perform the mutual authentication that was validated by AVISPA goals authenti-
cation on sk1 and authentication on sk2 in scenario 4.
Security goal M-2 (message authentication) has two components, authentication of the data
origination point and verification of data integrity. Data origin is verified by encrypting the
secret keys shared by the entities participating in the communication. The secrecy of these
keys is ensured by the security goal M-3.
Security goal M-3 (RP key secrecy) was validated by AVISPA goals secrecy of sec a SK,
sec g SK, sec GK in scenario 4. It is achieved by the fact that strong authentication is chosen
when the two peers perform the IKE INIT exchange.
Security goal M*-1 (RP keys secrecy) is validated by AVISPA goals secrecy of and sec gk in







AVISPA is used to validate RKMP, MaRK and MRKM based on the scenarios created in Section
4. Although AVISPA has four back-ends, only two of them are adopted in our experiments, namely
OFMC and CL-AtSe. CL-AtSe is the back-end that translates a protocol specification into constraints
and finds possible attacks on the protocol, while OFMC is the back-end that has the highest speed
in finding attacks on a protocol. The other two back-ends, SATMC and TA4SP, are not designed to
validate our security goals.
5.1.1 Scenario 1
The validation results of both OFMC and CL-AtSe are “SAFE”. The scenario simulation is
shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: CL-AtSe output for Scenario 1
Figure 5.2: OFMC output for Scenario 1
5.1.2 Scenario 2
The validation results of both OFMC and CL-AtSe are “SAFE”. The scenario simulation is
shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: CL-AtSe output for Scenario 2
Figure 5.4: OFMC output for Scenario 2
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5.1.3 Scenario 3
As shown in Figure 5.5, the validation result of CL-AtSe back-end is “SAFE”. There is no result
for OFMC.
Figure 5.5: CL-AtSe output for Scenario 3
5.1.4 Scenario 4
As shown in Figure 5.6, the validation result of both OFMC and CL-AtSe are “SAFE”.
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Figure 5.6: CL-AtSe output for Scenario 4
Figure 5.7: OFMC output for Scenario 4
5.1.5 Scenario 5
The validation result of both OFMC and CL-AtSe are “SAFE”. The scenario simulation is shown
in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.8: CL-AtSe output for Scenario 5
Figure 5.9: OFMC output for Scenario 5
5.2 Analysis
In all the above cases, we have seen that the OFMC and the CL-AtSe back-ends of AVISPA
have reported the results as “SAFE”. This means that the key management protocols RKMP, MaRK
and MRKM successfully meet the security goals, authentication and secrecy of required parameters,
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which are specified in the HLPSL code. The results also show that the other goals that we have
modeled are satisfied. As explained in Section 3.2, these include protection from replay attacks and
message integrity.
Since RKMP is a key management protocol for peers, the distribution of keys is relatively simple,
which is why we focus our analysis on the authentication procedure. For MaRK, we modeled the
election procedure between two routers and among three routers, and we also modeled the key
distribution of MRKM. Finally we show a summary of how RKMP, MaRK and MRKM meet all the
requirements. To further explain it, the analysis is listed in Table 5.2.
Goal Requirements and Factors
Goal# Requirement Factors to achieve goal
R-1 Peer authentication, to make sure
each peer in the network is valid,
mutual authentication must be
performed
Achieved through multiple factors: KE is generated
by Diffie-Hellman based on peer’s key material, and
AUTH payload, which is encrypted using peer’s pri-
vate key to prevent man-in-the-middle attack




R-3 Confidentiality of RP keys. The
RP keys are derived to protect the
routing protocols, so it must be
kept secret
RP keys are generated by Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
with AUTH payload, we can assure the confidential-
ity of the keys will be kept between two peers
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Goal# Requirement Factors to achieve goal
R-4 Perfect forward security (PFS)
and perfect backward security
(PBS). If necessary, the network
devices may destroy the state as-
sociated with the IKEv2 SA then
rekey an IKEv2 SA and establish
a new equivalent IKEv2 SA
In peers, if both network devices choose to retain
the RP policy and keying material, the use of CRE-
ATE CHILD SA is required to do the rekey
M-1 Group member authentication, to
make sure all members in the
network are valid, GCKS must
authenticate the router before it
joins the group
MRKM performs GSA AUTH exchange to authen-
ticat both group member and GCKS, AUTHa and
AUTHb payloads contain the authentication informa-
tion for GCKS and group member respectively




M-3 Confidentiality of RP keys. The
RP keys are derived to protect the
routing protocols, so it must be
kept secret
RP keys are generated by Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
with AUTH payload, we can assure the confidential-
ity of the keys will be kept between two peers
M-4 Perfect forward security (PFS)
and perfect backward security
(PBS). If necessary, a GCKS may
need to change the group policy
and/or rekey before current keys
expire
GCKS can send an INFORMATIONAL exchange
with a Notify payload directing the group member
to re-register. Alternatively, GCKS can distribute a
GSA REKEY exchange if GCKS policy support the
G-IKEv2 group maintenance channel
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Goal# Requirement Factors to achieve goal
Ma-1 Authenticity of the GCKS. If an
adversary participates in the elec-
tion procedure, it should not pass
the authentication
MaRK uses IKE to handle the peer’s key manage-
ment, AUTH payload in IKE AUTH exchange could
authenticate peers mutually
Ma-2 Authenticity of the initiating
routers. The initiating routers
need to authenticate to GCKS
AUTH payload
Ma-3 Message authentication of the
group key management mes-
sages, which includes origin au-
thentication and integrity authen-
tication
AUTH payload
Ma-4 Confidentiality of RP keys.
While routing security does not
typically require confidentiality,
the key management protocol
does because keys are exchanged
and these must be protected
When GCKS distributes group key using
GSA AUTH exchange, AUTH payload is re-
quired, which is encrypted by peer’s private key.
After the GCKS authenticates a group member,
group member could get the group key encrypted by
the session key to keep the integrity
Ma-5 Perfect forward security (PFS)
and perfect backward security
(PBS). The GCKS MUST
change the protocol master key
if a router was part of the group
under the current protocol master
key and reboots
In peers, if both of the network devices choose to
retain the RP policy and keying material, the use of
CREATE CHILD SA is required to do the rekeying
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Protection against replay attacks.
If an adversary replays an old
message, the system must be able
to ignore it














The operation of routing protocols should be secure. Unfortunately, this is not often true in real
deployments. If security is enabled at all, the security keys are installed once and forgotten. In order
to improve this situation, the first step is to ensure that key assignment can be done automatically.
Key management protocols (KMP) exist for IPsec; these include IKE and IKEv2 (for unicast) and
GDOI (for multicast). These KMP have been formally validated for their security properties.
However, while some routing protocols use IPsec to ensure their security, other routing protocols
have different security approaches, such as using an authentication trailer within the routing protocol
or using TCP-Authentication Option to communicate with peers.
The Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) working group of the IETF has
proposed several KMPs for routing protocols. To our knowledge, there are no formal validations of
the security of these proposals. In this thesis, we focus on three KMPs: RKMP, MRKM, and MaRK.
We validate them with the AVISPA tool to ensure that they meet the necessary security requirements.
We first enumerate the desirable security properties for routing protocols, and separate them into
those that can be formally validated, and those that cannot.
We then design a scenario for RKMP to model its peer authentication. Although the message
exchanges of RKMP have the same structure as IKEv2, they have different payloads. This modeling
process allows us to confirm the validity of our approach.
MaRK, on the other hand, defines a new election system that gives MaRK the ability to self-heal
and to tolerate errors when the Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) fails, which makes the
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routing group “Autonomous”. Since this election procedure has never been analyzed, we design two
scenarios to model the election procedure when it is between two routers and when it is among three
routers. We assign the priorities to these routers by randomly generating the numbers and use the
same technique to mutually authenticate the GCKS and the members.
After the election, there are two kinds of members to which the GCKS could distribute keys:
authenticated members and unauthenticated members. One of the aspects of security is that the GCKS
must not distribute keys to the unauthenticated members. Based on those two kinds of members, we
designed two scenarios for MRKM to test its security. MRKM is an extension to G-IKEv2, which in
turn is an updating of GDOI from IKE exchanges to IKEv2 exchanges. MRKM is able to provide
authenticity, integrity and authority when it is doing the key management for multicast situations.
We then analyzed the five scenarios above using the AVISPA modelling tool. The result formally
proved that the key management protocols RKMP, MaRK, and MRKM have the necessary security
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